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? I would like to express my special appreciation to the UK Takeover
 
Panel, Paul Davies (Oxford University), Mark S Rawlinson and
 
Stephen Hewes (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer), Tatsuo Uemura
(Waseda University),Hiroshi Oda(London University),Harald Baum
(Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private
 
Law)and the members of the Studying Group on UK M & A at the
 
Japanese Securities Research Institute(Chair:Hideki Kanda,Univer-
sity of Tokyo)for giving me many useful suggestions on this article.
Please note that what is stated in this report is ultimately based on
 
my understanding and viewpoint, and any possible error must be
 
attributed to me alone.
What is more, regarding my more detailed view on reforming
 
Japanese Takeover Law, please refer to this article “Hiroyuki
 
Watanabe,Designing a New Takeover Regime for Japan～Suggestions
 
from the European Takeover Rules,Zeitschrift fu?r Japanishes Recht,
Nr.30(Max-Planck-Institute fu?r Privatrecht,2010)”.
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Ⅰ.Increasing Attention to UK-style takeover regulations
 
Compared to the US-style regulations―where companies are basi-
cally allowed to introduce defensive measures (countermeasures)
against takeovers and courts have the last word in settling
(１)
disputes,we
 
should pay more attention to the UK-style regulations―under the
 
detailed rules on control transfer,a specialized organization for take-
over regulations,which consists of M&A specialists,deals with take-
over cases promptly and flexibly, while companies basically do not
 
introduce defensive measures.We should seriously discuss the idea of
 
importing these UK rules.The creation of a specialized organization
(１) Another big problem is that it takes too much time to obtain a court’s
 
decision.Although it is difficult to simply compare the number of days required
 
for individual suits, in the United States where about one-third of takeover
 
cases are brought to courts,it is said that even the Delaware State courts,which
 
have established a reputation for handling cases promptly,need at least several
 
weeks on average,or even as much as several months,to reach a conclusion on
 
a takeover dispute.
早法86巻２号（2011）286
 
for takeover regulations will be significantly beneficial not only for
 
improving efficiency in takeover regulations but also for reducing costs
 
incurred by companies for taking defense against hostile
(２)
takeovers.
In Japan,it often becomes an issue in courts whether the offeror is a
“green-mailer”or an “abusive acquirer.”In addition to such frame-
work for judging the attribute of the offeror, it is also necessary to
 
establish concrete rules by which an abusive acquirer can be selected
 
and excluded automatically. Furthermore, in the phase to acquire
 
control over a company, the acquirer must disclose real beneficiaries
 
who will gain real benefit from the control transfer,not merely disclos-
ing registered shareholders.
It seems to me that there is a widespread notion in Japan that any
 
conduct not prohibited by statutory law can be construed as legal and
 
can therefore be done without problem.Many rules included in the UK
 
Takeover Code provide adequate implications about how to close the
 
loopholes that currently exist in the Japanese law, and it may be
 
possible to adopt these rules in Japan.Under said Code,when there is
 
no direct Rule,decisions are made by going back to the“
(３)
Principles.”
In the United Kingdom,the Takeover Panel has existed since1968as
 
an organization specialized in takeover regulations.Based on the Rules
 
in the City Code(the current Takeover Code),specialists in the Panel
 
have enforced market-oriented regulations of takeovers promptly and
 
flexibly.In view of such a situation in the United Kingdom,I believe
(２) This is separate from the idea of integrating members of the independent
 
committees for takeover issues in individual companies nationwide, into one
 
organization.
(３) Recently, since the Code has developed to include further detailed provi-
sions with more Rules and Notes,the need to go back to the Principles to make
 
decisions does not frequently occur.
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that Japan should now seriously consider creating a Japanese version of
 
the Takeover Code or Takeover Panel.
Ⅱ.Structure and subject of the Takeover Code(City Code)
Since its establishment in 1969, the City Code on Takeovers and
 
Mergers has gone through several revisions.Today,the Panel calls it
“Takeover Code”or simply “Code,”rather than “City Code.”This
 
report follows suit.
The Code applies to the companies which have their registered
 
offices in the United
(４)
Kingdom,if any of their securities are admitted to
 
trading on a regulated market in the United
(５)
Kingdom;it also applies to
 
other companies that satisfy certain
(６)
requirements.
The Code has four parts, namely, Introduction, General Principles,
Definitions, and Rules. Introduction is divided into the following sec-
tions:(1)Overview;(2)The Code:(3)Companies,Transactions and
 
Persons Subject to the Code; (4)The Panel and its Committees; (5)
The Executive;(6)Interpreting the Code;(7)Hearing Committee;(8)
Takeover Appeal Board ;(9)Providing Information and Assistance to
 
the Panel and the Panel’s Power to Require Documents and Informa-
tion ; (10)Enforcing the Code; (11)Disciplinary Powers; (12)Co-
operation and Information Sharing ; and (13)Fees and Charges.
The second part provides for General Principles:(1)fair treatment
(４) Including the Channel Islands(the Jersey and the Guernsey)and the Isle
 
of Man.
(５) Including Societas Europaea.
(６) Takeover Code, Introduction, 3 (a), (Ⅰ)・(Ⅱ). The Code applies to
 
almost all public companies;it may apply to other companies if they have are
 
public in nature.
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of shareholders;(2)arrangement to enable shareholders to reach a
 
proper decision; (3) the board of directors’duty of royalty; (4)
prohibition of stock price manipulation;(5)offeror’s duty of careful
 
consideration;and (6)prohibition of hindering the offeree company
(target company)from conducting its business affairs.These Princi-
ples are applied in accordance with their spirit. The Definitions part
 
specifies the definitions of the terms and phrases used in the Code,and
 
the Rules part stipulates specific Rules.Unlike the provisions of statu-
tory law,legal terms are not frequently used in the Rules.The Rules are
 
to be interpreted to achieve their underlying purpose;therefore,their
 
spirit must be observed as well as their
(７)
letter.
The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders are
 
treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits
 
of a takeover and that shareholders of the same class are afforded
 
equivalent treatment by an offeror.The Code also provides an orderly
 
framework within which takeovers are conducted. In addition, it is
 
designed to promote,in conjunction with other regulatory regimes,the
 
integrity of the financial
(８)
markets.
The Code is not concerned with the financial or commercial advan-
tages or disadvantages of a takeover.These are matters for the com-
(７) Takeover Code,Introduction,2(b).The extent to which the Code applies
 
sometimes cannot be fully estimated, because the Code provides for General
 
Principles,and the Rules must also be observed in terms of their spirit as well
 
as their letters.However,the parties and their advisers can avoid committing
 
any act that may be in breach of the Code by making inquires to the Executive
 
of the Panel beforehand.Since they can get answers to their inquiries quickly,
this step of consulting the Executive cannot be an obstacle to the process for
 
carrying out takeovers.
(８) Takeover Code,Introduction,2(a).
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pany and its shareholders.Nor is the Code concerned with those issues,
such as competition policy,which are the responsibility of government
 
and other bodies.
The Panel’s role is not to hinder takeovers. The Panel is not con-
cerned with the very issue of whether a takeover will be successful or
 
not,and the number of offers is not a matter with which the Panel is
 
concerned.The Panel makes decisions not by considering which party
 
to a takeover is good or bad but by referring to the facts in accordance
 
with the Code.
The formal name of the Panel is the Panel on Takeovers and
 
Mergers.In addition to takeovers,the Code also applies to mergers and
 
allotments of new shares to third
(９)
parties.In the case of an offer for a
 
company which has its registered office in another member state of
 
European Economic Area (EEA)whose securities are admitted to
 
trading only on a regulated market in the United Kingdom (shared
 
jurisdiction),the state where the company’s registered office is located
 
shall be in charge of the matters concerning company law,whereas the
 
state where the transaction actually takes place shall be in charge of
 
the matters concerning the trading of the securities and the
(10)
offer.
Ⅲ. Characteristics of the Takeover Regulations by the
 
Takeover Panel
 
The takeover regulations enforced by the Takeover Panel are char-
acteristic on the following points.
(a)Composition and redeployment of members of the Panel
(９) Including schemes of arrangement (Code,Appendix 7).
(10) Takeover Code,Introduction,3(a), (Ⅲ).
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The term “Panel”in a broad sense refers to the organization as a
 
whole.The“Panel”in a narrow sense is composed of up to12members
 
who are designated by the Chairman,Deputy Chairmen(appointed by
 
the Panel)and the affiliated
(11)
bodies and then appointed by the Panel,as
 
well as members appointed by said bodies. Currently,Panel members
 
have a maximum of34seats.The term of office is three years, and
 
reappointment is allowed.Those affiliated bodies that play an impor-
tant role in the City are entitled to appoint and send their personnel as
 
Panel members,who contribute to the activities of the Panel.
Some people express concern that since most members come from
 
the financial industry,the regulations enforced by the Panel would be
 
somewhat inclined in favor of the industry.However,as far as I myself
 
have surveyed,no particular problem has occurred thus far.The Panel
 
enjoys a high status in the financial industry(the City).Any wrong-
doing by someone serving as Panel member would later cause signifi-
cant problems to the member’s business. Therefore, Panel members,
while in office,engage in regulatory activities independently from the
 
entities to which they belong.Almost all leading investment banks,law
 
firms and accounting firms have executives who have served as Panel
 
members,and they provide the Panel with talented employees who have
 
potential to be their executive staff in the future.These secondees to
 
the Executive concentrate on takeover regulations for two years,and
(11) At present,the following bodies may appoint members:the Association of
 
British Insurers;the Association of Investment Companies;the Association of
 
Private Client Investment Managers and Stockbrokers;the British Bankers’
Association;the Confederation of British Industry;the Institute of Chartered
 
Accountants in England and Wales;Investment Management Association;the
 
London Investment Banking Association;the National Association of Pension
 
Funds.〔Takeover Code,Introduction,4(a)〕.
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then go back to their banks or firms once they have developed their
 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the regulations.
Thus, this recruitment system is greatly beneficial to all parties
 
involved:those who can develop their careers, the entities to which
 
they return after acquiring experience,as well as the Panel itself,which
 
can secure high quality staff.
(b)Prompt and flexible application of rules,and consultation by the
 
Executive
 
The Executive carries out the Panel’s day-to-day work.It is current-
ly staffed by about 30people.Upon receiving an inquiry by telephone,
it gives an answer usually on the same day.In principle,two members
(a junior member and a senior member)take charge of one case,and
 
if any difficulties occur,they can ask for advice from other members.
In order to ensure consistency of decisions by the Executive,telephone
 
conversations are recorded and imparted to other members as feed-
back.The records of cases that the Executive has handled are compiled
 
into a database,which is not available to the public.
The Code contains a number of phrases that recognize the Panel’s
 
discretionary power,such as “except with the consent of the Panel,”
“with the consent of the Panel,”“unless otherwise agreed with the
 
Panel,”“should consult the Panel,”and so forth.The Executive has the
 
power to hand down rulings. An appeal may be filed against an
 
Executive’s ruling, but it is very rare for its rulings to be reversed
 
through appeal proceedings.
(c)Cooperation with and sanctions upon the major bodies in the City
 
The Panel has enforced regulations in cooperation with the major
 
bodies in the City.In the past,the Panel required these bodies―includ-
ing securities exchanges,the Bank of England,the former DTI(current
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BEER)―to report offenders or take measures that the Panel considers
 
appropriate.At the time when the Panel was established, its enforce-
ment was insufficient, and some people did not mind breaching the
 
Code. The Panel even took tough measures against such breach by
 
asking the exchange to suspend the offender’s transactions and prohibit
 
its use of the facilities of the
(12)
exchange.
(d)Relationship with the FSA
 
After the Financial Services and Markets Act2000was entered into
 
force and the Financial Services Authority(FSA)was established,the
 
Panel carried out regulatory activities backed up by“indirect regula-
tions”by the FSA.Upon request by the Panel, the FSA may impose
 
sanctions on financial service firms that have breached the
(13)
Code.The
 
cold-shoulder rule is also applied to prohibit financial service firms
 
from conducting any acts in relation to takeovers on behalf of those
 
who breached the
(14)
Code.
Since the FSA has become the only regulatory authority and acquired
 
a broad power,a conflict of powers has occurred between the FSA and
 
the Panel.To cope with this problem,the FSA has developed guidelines,
which provide the following : the FSA shall not exercise its power
 
during the offer period;and even when the FSA exercises its power in
(12) This is called the Saint Piran Case. It was the beginning of the cold-
shoulder rule, i.e. , the people in the City do not work for those who do not
 
follow the Code in the City.It is said that the successful implementation of this
 
rule resulted in firmly establishing the authority of the regulations by the Panel.
The Takeover Panel,Statements,Suspension of offeree company shares pend-
ing statement by the Panel following a Panel hearing (S144.3.1R of FSA
 
Handbook,Market Conduct (MAR).aint Piran Limited,1980/4).
(13) Section134of the Financial Services and Markets Act2000(FSMA),and
4.2.1R of FSA Handbook,Market Conduct (MAR).
(14) 4.3.1R of FSA Handbook,Market Conduct (MAR).
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exceptional cases,it shall consult the Panel in advance if its exercise of
 
power is likely to affect the timetable or outcome of the
(15)
offer.
(e)Appeal proceedings
 
The Executive holds a hearing and hands down a ruling on the case
 
under the following circumstances:the Panel finds any act that is in
 
breach of the Code and should be subject to disciplinary action;the
 
party is dissatisfied with the Panel’s decision;a difficult issue occurs
 
and the Executive is unable to decide
(16)
on it.An appeal may further be
 
filed against the Executive’s ruling based on the results of the
(17)
hearing.
The availability of such due process is an important reason for the
 
courts to basically respect the Panel’s decisions. It is difficult for the
 
parties to a takeover to go to the court without first going through
 
appeal proceedings.
(f)Restrained attitude of courts in judicial review
 
The court does not interfere with the Panel during the offer period,
and even when it makes a judicial review,it does not directly involve
 
itself in the case. In the past few cases filed for judicial review, the
 
courts showed
(18)
restraint.
(15) Operating Guidelines between the Financial Services Authority and the
 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers on Market Misconduct (6 April 2007).
Formulated in 2001,and partially revised in 2006and 2007.
(16) Hearings were previously held by the Full Panel,and they are currently
 
held by the Hearings Committee.
(17) In the past, the second appeal was examined by the Appeal Committee
 
within the Panel.After the national legislation transposing the EU Takeover
 
Directive (the entry into force of the Companies Act 2006), the Takeover
 
Appeal Board was established as an independent body from the Panel, and
 
skilled legal professionals of the board deal with the appeal cases.
(18) Regina v Panel on Take-overs,ex parte Datafin plc［1987］QB815;Regina
 
v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers,Ex Parte Guinness Plc.［1989］2W.L.R.
863;Regina v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers,ex parte Fayed and others
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There are other reasons why the Panel has been successful,as a self
-regulating body,in carrying out takeover regulations effectively.(i)
The first factor is the Panel’s prompt response to offers.In the United
 
Kingdom,when a tender offer is made, the board of directors of the
 
offeree company swiftly decides whether or not to recommend the offer
 
and notifies shareholders of its decision.They do not hold its decision
 
or gain time without good reasons,which often occurs in Japan.The
 
offeror’s attribute or nationality rarely matters as long as the offeror
 
observes the UK takeover rules and principles.
(ii) Secondly, the professionalism of the people working in the
 
financial industry in the City,which was originally authorized as self-
government under the Magna Carta,is unimaginably stronger than that
 
in Japan. They place great importance on maintaining the industry
 
where they belong and their own profession.
From the perspective of enforcement,there is a significantly impor-
tant fact that in the United Kingdom,it has become a de facto obliga-
tion for both the offeror and the offeree to have
(19)
advisers,and(iii)as
 
a result, takeover rules have been enforced by way of not only the
 
parties to a takeover but also such advisers from investment banks, etc.
As mentioned above, the customary rule (cold-shoulder rule)―the
 
people in the City do not work for those who do not follow the Code in
 
the City―has been established as a norm.It seems that this norm has
 
served as a very powerful norm to the people both in and outside the
［1992］BCLC 938.
(19) An offeror who makes a cash offer must submit a financing statement
 
prepared by its adviser,whereas the offeree company must obtain competent
 
and independent advice on the offer from a third party,such as its adviser.
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City because it would be difficult to be a party to a takeover without
 
an adviser.
Both the offeror and the offeree have their own advisers, and the
 
rival offeror will also have its own adviser.It depends on the case for
 
which party each investment bank,etc.is to serve as an adviser.Under
 
such circumstances,it could be said that(iv)the Panel’s decisions have
 
not been inclined in favor of any one of the parties due to structural
 
reasons, because the industry itself has continued to provide Panel
 
members.Thus,(v)in the City,the regulating party and the regulated
 
party have the same nature,and this may also be a big factor that has
 
made the Panel’s self-regulation
(20)
effective.
Ⅳ．National Legislation Transposing the EU Takeover
 
Directives and the Takeover
(21)
Panel
 
The Panel regulations,which had been carried out in effect without
 
relying on statutory
(22)
law, have changed as a result of the national
 
legislation transposing the EU Takeover Directives and the enactment
(20) This viewpoint was kindly suggested by Mr.Noel Hinton(former member
 
of the Executive of the Takeover Panel),Mr.Takumi Shibata(Deputy Presi-
dent of Nomura Holdings),and M & A specialists from the City.
(21) For more detailed discussion on the relationship between the national
 
legislation transposing the EU Takeover Directive(UK Companies Act 2006)
and the Takeover Panel, see Watanabe, op. cit., “Seiteiho? ni Motozukanai
 
Kigyo?Baishu?Kisei to sono Henyo?”(Non-statutory takeover regulations and
 
their changes).
(22) The Financial Services Act Order1987designates the Panel as one of the
 
regulatory bodies. The Panel already had its basis in statutory law in this
 
respect,but this was merely a matter of categorization.In practice,until the
 
Companies Act2006entered into force,the Panel had not enforced any regula-
tions based on statutory law.
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of the Companies Act 2006. What has and has not changed in the
 
regulations through this legislative process?
Under the EU Takeover Directive adopted in 2004, it was provided
 
that Member States shall effect national legislation transposing the
 
Directive no later than May20,
(23)
2006.The Directive aims to incorporate
 
supervision and regulation of takeovers into the framework of statu-
tory law in all EU Member States.The Panel initially did not agree to
 
such framework designed by the Directive,arguing that it would impair
 
the good points of self-
(24)
regulation.The UK government,the Panel,and
 
many other parties concerned hoped that the transposition of the
 
Directive into national law would have the minimum impact on the
 
Panel’s activities,and they discussed the content of the Directive again
 
and again.As a result of such repeated discussions, they reached the
 
conclusion that it would be possible to implement the national version
 
of the Directive while causing little or no substantial change to the
 
Panel’s function.The Panel itself finally approved the content of the
(25)
Directive.
After the national legislation transposing the Directive was complet-
ed,the Panel has continued to act as a regulatory body for takeover
 
activities.While acquiring additional powers, such as the powers to
 
require documents and information and order compensation, it has
 
maintained its broad discretion,without almost no substantial change
(23) Although most Member States failed to enact national laws by the due
 
date, they subsequently fulfilled the obligation of national legislation one by
 
one.
(24) The Takeover Panel Report on the year ended (31March 2001), at 9,
Chairman’s Statement (Peter Scott QC).
(25) The Takeover Panel Report and Accounts for the year ended (31March
2005),at 13,Report by the Director General.
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to its existing powers. Each Member State was obliged to establish
 
national rules corresponding to the provisions of the Directive,includ-
ing the following :general principles(Article3.1);jurisdiction(Article
4.2),protection of minority shareholders, the mandatory bid and the
 
equitable price(Article5);content of bid documents(Article6.1-6.3,
Article7,Article8);and obligations of the board of the offeree com-
pany(Article9).To fulfill this obligation,the United Kingdom incorpo-
rated the relevant provisions in the Companies Act2006.Along with the
 
national legislation, the ten initial General Principles under the City
(26)
Code were replaced with six new principles,but there was no special
 
modification of the content of the Code.
Article942of the Companies Act 2006explicitly stipulates that the
 
Panel has its basis in this Act.With this provision,the Panel is now a
 
body under this Act.It has been given the powers to do the following :
hand down rulings concerning the Rules(Article945,Article946);grant
 
exemption from application of the Rules and revise the Rules(Article
944);require documents and information (Article 947);impose sanc-
tions (Article 952);order compensation for the breach of the Code
(Article954);and apply to the court for enforcement(Article955).On
 
the other hand,the duty to cooperate with the FSA has been imposed
 
upon the Panel(Article950).In addition,the Act also provides for the
 
proceedings for hearings and appeals (Article 951), as well as the
(26) 1. Fair treatment of shareholders;2. uniform information disclosure to
 
shareholders;3. offeror’s duty of prudence;4. arrangement to enable share-
holders to reach a proper decision;5. accuracy of documents and advertise-
ment;6.prohibition of stock price manipulation;7.duty of neutrality of the
 
offeree company’s board of directors;8.duty to exercise the company’s control
 
in good faith and prohibition of oppression of minority shareholders;9.direc-
tor’s duty of royalty;10.mandatory offer
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restriction on the disclosure of information provided for the Panel in
 
the course of enforcement of regulations(Article948and Article949).
Now that the Panel is a statutory body,there is concern that tactical
 
litigation,which means an action to seek judicial review on the Panel’s
 
ruling,could be used as a means to stop the other party to a takeover
 
from carrying through with the takeover procedure.However,the EU
 
Takeover Directive has vested the governments and courts of the
 
Member States with a broad power to decide how to deal with litigation
 
against the takeover supervisory authorities(Article4,paragraph6of
 
the Directive). The UK Companies Act 2006 also provides that the
 
parties to a takeover may not file an action against the Panel’s decision
(Article956).
Upon the national legislation transposing the EU Takeover Directive,
the Panel has been given many statutory powers.This is not because
 
the Panel itself particularly asked for such powers, but because the
 
Directive requires the supervisory authorities of the Member States to
 
have those powers.However,obtaining powers as a result of legislation
 
is different from actually exercising the powers.There has been basi-
cally no change in the actual regulatory activities carried out by the
 
Panel,and neither the Panel itself nor the professionals engaging in this
 
field desire the Panel to
(27)
change.
(27) This view was heard in interviews with the Takeover Panel,practitioners
 
working in the City,the FSA and scholars.
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